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Taxpayers may reveal their assessment of policy through exercise of available voice and
exit options within the fiscal constitution. The voice option is utilized when taxpayers
remain within political boundaries and attempt to communicate their assessments regard
ing the institutional status quo to policymakers. Exercise of the exit option occurs when
taxpayers signal discontent with the status quo by purchasing from another government
supplier. This paper discusses and contrasts the conventional and constitutional econom
ics views toward fiscal design and argues that a major difference exists regarding the issue
of who should be awarded primary responsibility in the policy process: taxpayers or
policymakers? Because voice and exit options determine the relative leverage oftaxpay
ers and policymakers in the policy process, it is argued that the design of voice and exit
options in the fiscal constitution exerts a predictable influence on policy. The paper
concludes that one's view toward the design of voice and exit options is affected by one's
perception of the appropriate size of government. Competitive fiscal structures tend to
be advocated by those who believe that government tends to overexpand and monopolistic
structures tend to be advocated by those who believe that government tends to be too
small.

Introduction
The design of fiscal structure is one of the most important issues in
government supply. Two elements characterize fiscal structure: the
initial intergovernmental arrangement and the mechanisms, if any, that
may trigger changes in that arrangement over time. Fiscal structures
may be designed with little or much choice in government supply.
Government monopoly eliminates choice for taxpayers while intergov
ernmental competition allows a degree ofchoice in supply for taxpayers.
Taxpayers may reveal their assessment of government policy through
exercise of "voice" and "exit" options (Hirschman 1970). The voice
option is exercised when taxpayers remain within political boundaries
and attempt to communicate their assessments regarding the status quo
to policymakers. Exercise of the exit option occurs when taxpayers
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signal discontent with the status quo by purchasing from another gov
ernment supplier.
The conventional literature on fiscal structure is interested in design
ing efficient intergovernmental arrangements. Spending and taxing
powers are divided among governments in the pursuit of allocative
efficiency and various equity goals. As discussed by various scholars
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Wiseman 1990), this literature is more
interested in prescribing policy outcomes than analyzing the process
by which individual taxpayers establish contracts with policymakers.
Limited choice in government supply is often part of the fiscal design
that promotes various policy outcomes (e.g., maximizing allocative
efficiency). By limiting the ability of taxpayers to signal discontent
through exercise of the exit option, the conventional view towards fiscal
arrangements recommends that taxpayers be allowed only the voice
option as the tool for producing an efficient social contract and public
sector. However, in addition to providing policies that are directly
demanded by taxpayers, removal of exit options allows policymakers
to provide policies that are not directly demanded by taxpayers.
Proponents of the constitutional economics view of fiscal constitu
tions award greater leverage to individual taxpayers in the public policy
process. In addition to voice options, greater choice through intergov
ernmental competition enables taxpayers to use exit options to influence
policy. The threat of exit also enhances the ability of taxpayers to
effectively exercise voice options in the public policy process.
This paper discusses and contrasts the conventional and constitu
tional economics approaches toward designing efficient fiscal arrange
ments within a simple model of the policy process. A major difference
is their view regarding who should be given primary leverage in the
policy process: taxpayers or policymakers? It is argued that the design
of voice and exit options in the fiscal constitution exerts a predictable
influence on policy outcomes. Design of voice and exit options deter
mines the relative leverage of policymakers and taxpayers in the policy
process and, over time, the abilities of taxpayers to change policies.
As an example of a program designed as a monopoly of the federal
government, the paper discusses the U.S. Social Security program. The
paper concludes that policy prescriptions regarding the design of voice
and exit options in fiscal structures are strongly affected by one's nor
mative perception of the appropriate size of government.

I. Simple Model of the Public Policy Process
A simple model of the public policy process in a representative
democracy is I
taxpayer ~ policymaker ~ policy.
Taxpayers signal preferences to policymakers who, in tum, enact pol
icy. This ideal setting avoids many complexities that inform the design
of a fiscal constitution. The following are perennial topics in policy
analysis. What motivates policymakers? For example, if one assumes
that policymakers are self-interested, then the various constraints on
policymakers influence their ability to pursue their self-interests at the
expense of taxpayers. How well do taxpayers reveal their preferences
to policymakers? Even ifpolicymakers are not self-interested, inabilit
ies of taxpayers to articulate preferences to policymakers may create
differences between actual and desired policies. Moreover, even if
taxpayers could perfectly articulate preferences, policymakers may not
have the technical expertise to provide desired policy outcomes.
This paper studies the general issue of how the design of voice and
exit options in the fiscal constitution affects the public policy process.
That is, how do different institutional settings influence the mix of
power between taxpayers and policymakers in the policy process? For
example, does elimination of the exit option influence the outcome of
the interaction between taxpayers and policymakers? Does elimination
of the exit option influence the abilities of taxpayers to successfully
pursue their preferences in the policy process? We consider two models
of the policy process: conventional and constitutional economics
models.
D. Conventional View of Efficient Fiscal Structures
An underlying theme of the conventional view is that voluntary inter
actions of private citizens within private markets fail to allocate
resources efficiently. Public production is often justified on the assump
tion that private markets fail to optimally provide goods with properties
of joint consumption and free-rider problems. Based on various effi
ciency criteria, the different public policies are allocated to specific
1 Assume citizens and taxpayers are identical and that organized pressure groups do
not exist.

levels of government (Oates 1972). Redistributive and stabilization
activities are generally believed to be the province ofthe central govern
ment (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). Monopoly provision of redistri
bution policies by central governments is often based on arguments that
intergovernmental competition results in underproduction (Musgrave
1959 and Oates 1972). Public goods and services that are mainly local
in nature are allocated to noncentral governments.
An implication of this view is that public markets improve the alloca
tion of various resources and that taxpayers and policymakers should
determine where resources are better allocated through the policy pro
cess. Within our simple model ofthe policy process, taxpayer~ policy
maker ~ policy, policymakers are assumed to be passive agents of
the desires of taxpayers for a better allocation of resources. But it is
important to realize that there are two different roles for policymakers
in the policy process. One, taxpayers recognize that certain goods are
characterized by nonrival consumption, nonexc1usion and free rider
problems and that they need to be provided by the public sector. This
communication may be signalled through exercise of the voice option
of Hirschman's (1970) model and may be accomplished, for example,
by taxpayers utilizing voting rights and writing letters to policymakers.
In this case, policymakers are the passive agents of the articulated
demands of taxpayers for specific public policies.
Two, policymakers may believe that taxpayers do not adequately
understand the extent to which private markets fail to produce certain
goods. 2 Policymakers may justify providing policies that are not directly
demanded by taxpayers. Information on the appropriateness of govern
ment policy is viewed, in the case of taxpayers, as an asymmetric
resource in relatively short supply. Cases where taxpayers are observed
attempting to avoid policies represent some of these justified policies
that are not directly appreciated by taxpayers. To the extent that tax
payers lack sufficient information about market failure, tax.payers will
not be able to adequately communicate their policy preferences to
policymakers. Thisjustification for government policy is awarded much
discussion in conventional analysis of optimal fiscal structure and usu
ally considers mobility of taxpayers as a problem that government
2 See Littlechild and Wiseman (1986) for a discussion of three alternative frameworks
(market failure, paternalist and libertarian) for the political economy of forcing taxpayers
to accept government programs.

monopoly overcomes. 3 Pauly (1973) argues that redistribution policies
of noncentral governments become self-defeating as long as citizens are
mobile since, when one noncentral government raises its redistribution
from the rich to the poor, the poor enter the jurisdiction as the rich
leave. Because mobility thwarts the goals of redistributive policies,
monopolistic provision is viewed as an appropriate device that restricts
the adverse effects of mobility by taxpayers. Musgrave and Musgrave
(1989: 459) argue:
It follows that if policies aimed at adjusting the distribution of income
among people are to be effective, they must be conducted primarily at the
central or national level. By the same token, decentralization reduces
the capacity to undertake redistributional policies. Implications for such
policies are therefore a strategic factor in the centralization-versus-decen
tralization issue.

Revenue-sharing and intergovernmental grants are also devices
which restrict abilities of taxpayers to thwart the goals of policymakers.
Both programs have the central government collecting taxes in excess
of its spending and sharing the residual with noncentral governments.
These programs are often proposed in cases of externalities (Ibid.). On
a global level, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989: 455) argue that increasing
internationalization of markets calls for international centralization of
macroeconomic policies. Another rationale for monopolization is that
larger government units exploit scale economies which serve to lower
production costs.
The recent proposal in Rivlin (1991) for the reform of the fiscal
constitution demonstrates the conventional view. "Uniform shared
taxes" are argued to be a solution to many problems (e.g., low savings
rate and inadequate government production) in our economy. A pro
gram of "uniform shared taxes" is argued to correct two problems:
1) states are unable to raise sufficient taxes because ofinterstate govern
ment competition and 2) states have unequal resources.
The basic idea is that states, with or without the help of the federal
government, share the proceeds of a common tax on a formula basis ...
The group of states agreeing to share the tax could include all 50 or could
be a smaller regional grouping ... For example, the federal government
3 However, Buchanan's (1950) fiscal residuum theory demonstrates that even with
identical redistribution programs, migration would still exist on the basis of income
differentials across jurisdictions.

could enact a 5 percent value-added tax, which would raise about $100
billion a year, and distribute it directly to the states ... Ideally, the formula
should be simple and should redistribute resources to some extent toward
the poorer states (Rivlin 1991: 12).

This argument implies that changing the fiscal constitution enhances
the abilities of policymakers to promote the public interest. Exit options
are viewed as problems that a revised fiscal constitution should elimi
nate by removing interstate tax-differentials. It is important to note that
the appropriate impetus for changing the fiscal constitution is argued
to be from policymakers, not taxpayers. That is, that taxpayers are
responsive to interstate tax differentials is assumed to not reflect an
appropriate impetus for changing the fiscal constitution in the direction
oflowering the tax rates ofhigh tax states. Because ofbetter information
on the appropriateness of policy, policymakers should be able to re
design the fiscal constitution in ways that lessen the abilities of taxpay
ers to flee additional policies. An implication of the conventional view
is that government tends to be too small when numerous exit options
are a characteristic of the fiscal constitution.
Another implication of the conventional view is that the interests of
taxpayers are not always served by choice in government supply. Rivlin
(1991: 9) argues:
... spending programs in which national uniformity is important to effec
tive functioning belong on the federal docket. Air traffic control is one of
these. So is social insurance. No one would want 50 different social
security systems, each with its own rules for payment and eligibility.

This view implies that policymakers make wise choices when designing
programs such as Social Security and that fiscal constitutions should
eliminate the abilities of taxpayers to utilize the exit option to thwart
the provision of those programs. The implied logic is that elimination
of choice in government supply eliminates the abilities of taxpayers to
choose unwise programs and that, by awarding policymakers greater
leverage in the policy process, social welfare is increased. The knowl
edge that allows policymakers to supply wise programs is either a direct
result of the communications of taxpayers to policymakers (through the
voice option) or through the abilities of policymakers to determine and
provide those policies that taxpayers do not understand that they need
(and therefore would not be communicated through the voice option).
In sum, the conventional analysis of efficiency in fiscal structure
prescribes government monopolization as an appropriate correction for

problems inherent in a world of taxpayer mobility and asymmetric
information between taxpayers and policymakers. Removal of exit pos
sibilities controls the abilities of citizens to thwart the beneficent aims
of policymakers. Removal of exit options is not considered a problem
for taxpayers because taxpayer-to-policymaker communication
through exercise of the voice option is relatively perfect and any addi
tional, and appropriate, policy that is not demanded by taxpayers will
be provided by far-sighted policymakers. In order for the second policy
category to be delivered to taxpayers, policymakers must remove or
reduce exit options through restricting intergovernmental competition.

III. Constitutional Economics View of Efficient Fiscal Structure
A counter view of the public policy process, taxpayer~ policymaker
~ policy, is that it is difficult for taxpayers to not only convey useful
communication to policymakers, but that self-interested policymakers
may be inclined to further interests that differ from those of taxpayers.
The models of logrolling, fiscal illusion, Leviathan, agenda control,
rent-seeking and monopoly bureaus cast some doubt on the ability of
taxpayers to communicate preferences through exercise of the voice
option and receive policy which serves their best interests. This view
of the policy process suggests the need to design fiscal constitutions
that protect taxpayers from receiving and paying for policies which they
do not desire. Because the voice option is viewed as an incomplete
means of communicating the desires of taxpayers to policymakers, an
important issue concerns how the design of the exit option influences
the public policy process. A fundamental difference in analysis between
the conventional and constitutional economics views is that the latter
is more interested in studying the process by which individual taxpayers
contract with policymakers rather than in prescribing final outcomes of
policies.
As Hirschman (1970) argues, exercise of the exit option is often a
"last resort" in that, either because of loyalty to current suppliers or
because of transactions costs, it is applied when customers believe
they can not effectively communicate (through voice options) strong
objections about the status quo. Seldon (1990: 106) argues that, in
general, the voice option is not a constraint on suppliers when the ability

to exercise the exit option is weak or nonexistent. 4 In the case of
government monopoly, lack of exit possibilities imposes a different
constraint on the taxpayer-policymaker relationship than when exit
possibilities pose a serious threat to policymakers that deliver policies
contrary to the interests of taxpayers. The constitutional economics
model does not assume that policymakers are benevolent or the passive
agents of taxpayers and, even if they were, policymakers are not
assumed to have any additional information on the appropriateness of
policy outcomes beyond that of the individual taxpayer. Removal of
exit options increases the leverage of policymakers in the taxpayer
policymaker relationship and therefore enhances the abilities of policy
makers to pursue their own interests. This model of the policy process
recognizes the possibility that governments "fail" and that policymak
ers may use fiscal structure, and monopoly power, to their advantage.
If the ability of the voice option to produce appropriate policies is
partially determined by the abilities of taxpayers to flee policies which
they do not desire, then removal of exit possibilities lowers the effec
tiveness of voice options and further reduces the leverage of taxpayers
in the policy process.
Wiseman (1990: 114) argues that analysis ofvoice and exit dimensions
of a fiscal constitution is a means of appraising the efficiency of social
arrangements, or the "responsiveness to the (subjective) value-systems
of the individual members of a society ... " Few voice and exit options
indicate a coercive fiscal constitution while many voice and exit options
indicate an efficient social contract. This definition of an efficient social
arrangement emphasizes the importance of the individual taxpayer and
that, no matter what ex post policy outcome may emerge from a particu
lar fiscal constitution, structures which coerce individual taxpayers are
not efficient. An underlying theme of this view of the policy process is
that fiscal constitutions should protect taxpayers from policymakers.
In contrast, the above-discussed proposal for "uniform shared taxes"
appears to rely on a methodology which protects policymakers from
taxpayers and emphasizes policy outcomes within "the ends justify

4 An interesting implication of this argument is that the ability of taxpayers to use the
exit option may affect the exercise of the voice option by taxpayers. For example, one
hypothesis may be that relatively monopolistic politicaljurisdictions experience relatively
low voter turn-out rates.

the means" rationale for designing fiscal constitutions which limit the
choices of taxpayers.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that exit options enhance the
abilities of taxpayers to control the self-interests of policymakers. 5
With free trade and costless migration, explicit fiscal constraints on
policymakers are argued to be unnecessary in a Tiebout (1956) world
of competing governments. That is, existence of many exit options
protects taxpayers from receiving policies which they do not desire.
Policymakers who deliver policies that taxpayers do not desire either
must start providing what taxpayers want or suffer an exodus of their
taxpayers to competing governments. However, the availability of exit
options only partially constrains the abilities of policymakers to pursue
their self-interests when there exist mobility costs, large central govern
ments and imperfect information. In this case, constitutional limits on
government are argued to be effective alternative controls on policy
makers. Since collusion potential falls with competition between suppli
ers, intergovernmental competition is viewed as a desirable constraint
on policymakers.
From the constitutional economics model of the policy process, the
inclusion of intergovernmental grants and revenue-sharing into fiscal
constitutions is also questioned. Consistent with Tullock's (1969) rent
seeking hypothesis, governments may be argued to seek collusive insti
tutional arrangements that weaken competitive pressures, such as a
system of grants where noncentral governments spend funds that they
themselves do not collect. As grants remove competitive pressures
between noncentral governments, grants also enhance the monopoly
power of the central government in its tax collection effort. McKenzie
and Staff (1978) and Lee (1985) view these activities as legal tax cartel
arrangements. That conventional analysis predicts that benevolent gov
ernments do not exploit such arrangements is evident from the above
discussion of Rivlin's (1991) proposal for "uniform shared taxes." A
prediction from the constitutional economics model is that, not only do
governments exploit such arrangements, governments actively create
such arrangements since they lower the abilities of taxpayers to utilize
5 It may be more informative to say that it protects taxpayers from receiving policies
which they do not desire. Whether or not some of these undesired policies are a product
of public-spirited policymakers or a product of self-interested policymaking is a complex
issue that will not be considered here.

voice and exit options to prevent unpopular policies which policymak
ers wish to deliver to them.

Iv.. Central Government Monopoly: The Case of Social Security
From a constitutional economics viewpoint, the central government's
monopoly in Social Security is predicted to eliminate intergovernmental
competition and lead it to be administered at relatively high resource
costs and low quality. Monopolization of Social Security also lowers
the financial incentive of taxpayers to vote-with-their-feet on the basis
of differential intergovernmental tax and spending policies. That is,
monopolization of Social Security influences intergovernmental compe
tition in two ways (Joulfaian and Marlow 1991). One way is to remove
possibilities for competition within the area of Social Security. Here
taxpayers can not gain, within a given country, by moving from one
government to another since all locations offer identical Social Security
tax burdens. Monopolization of this program removes the exit possibili
ties for this policy. While noncentral governments, and private firms,
also provide pensions, they are not competitors to the central govern
ment monopoly since their provision is over-and-above that of Social
Security. The recent growth ofprivate pensions, however, may indicate
the degree to which the Social Security system is viewed as inadequate
by taxpayers. 6 If subjected to competing government, or private, pro
viders, it is predicted that the current Social Security program would
experience substantial exodus by taxpayers, or would become more
efficient and attractive to participants. Without exit possibilities, tax
payers must rely on their exercise of the voice option and the wisdom
of policymakers to improve policy.
The other way that monopolization of Social Security influences
intergovernmental competition is through its influence on the competi
tiveness of aggregate government. Monopolization of the Social Secu
rity program not only eliminates intergovernmental competition within
the Social Security program, but it also reduces intergovernmental

6 For example, over 1970-1989, private pensions' share of total private financial assets
has grown from 2% to 4%. Data obtained from table 794 in U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1990).

competition between all programs of central and noncentral govern
ments. That is, monopolization of Social Security removes from compe
tition a subset of total government activity. For example, the ratio of
Social Security taxes-to-total government (federal + state + local)
taxes has risen from .03 to .24 over 1950-1989 and suggests that Social
Security policy has led to greater monopolization of the tax policies of
all governments. 7 The federal government monopoly in Social Security
also commands mandatory participation of virtually every worker. The
percentage of the civilian workforce covered under Social Security
has grown substantially over time: 58.7% (1950), 79.4% (1960),83.7%
(1970),90.2% (1980), 93.8% (1988). g The 1983 Amendments to the Social
Security Act granted coverage to virtually every new-hire in the work
force (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 195).
One specific example of the growing monopolization of Social Secu
rity is in the case ofstate and local government employees. For example,
before 1951, state and local government employees were ineligible for
participation in Social Security (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1987).
Several important changes since 1951 have affected the ability of state
and local governments to provide pensions to their employees. On
January 1, 1983, state and local governments were no longer able to
withdraw from the Federal program and effective April 1, 1986, the
health portion of Social Security became mandatory for all new state
and local government employees.
Crain and Marlow (1990) argue that Social Security exerts a positive
influence on the size of the federal government. When Congress passed
the Social Security Act of 1935, it did not require the Social Security
system to be fully-funded in the sense that it is not required to save, or
put aside, funds for payment of future obligations. Rather, its pay-as
you-go funding constraint only requires it to meet current operating
expenses and benefits. Current benefits of retirees are financed by the
current Social Security tax contributions of workers. While taxes in
excess of current obligations may be invested in its trust funds, policy
makers have the ability to use "excess" taxes to fund non-Social Secu
rity programs. This is possible, in part, because Social Security tax
revenues do not flow into its trust funds but, instead, in exchange for
7 Data obtained from U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1990).
8 Data for 1950, 1960 and 1970 obtained from Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) and for 1980
and 1988 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990).

IOUs to the trust funds, they flow like any other tax to the U.S.
Treasury. To the extent that Social Security taxes are viewed as saved
through the policy process, taxpayers may exhibit fiscal illusion
whereby taxpayers underestimate the discounted value of future tax
burdens. 9 Crain and Marlow (1990) present evidence that policymakers
use Social Security taxes to fund non-Social Security spending that lead
to overall federal government expansion.
It is useful to analyze the design of voice and exit options in the
institutional structure of the Social Security program. While conven
tional analysis of the policy process assumes that exercise of the voice
option produces useful communication from taxpayers to policymakers,
this may not be true in the case of Social Security. If, for example,
taxpayers do not fully understand the unique financing characteristics
of the program, then information they communicate to policymakers
will be imperfect. With weak voice characteristics and without exit
possibilities, implementation of appropriate policy requires that policy
makers somehow provide it. Under the conventional model ofthe policy
process, it is assumed that policymakers are up to the task, while the
constitutional economics model suggests that appropriate policy may
not be forthcoming.
It is also useful to analyze the conventional proposition, as suggested
in Rivlin (1991: 9), that "No one would want 50 different social security
programs, each with its own rules for payment and eligibility." This
proposition implies that the availability of choice in Social Security
supply would somehow produce a worse program than when it is
designed as a monopoly program of the federal government. Several
problems with this proposition are evident. With elimination of exit
options, what recourses are left for dissatisfied taxpayers in a world of
imperfect voice options and self-interested policymakers? Another
issue is whether or not elimination of the exit option reduces the proba
bility that appropriate changes in policies are possible over time. If
yes, removal of exit options violates the "responsiveness to the value
systems of individuals" component in Wiseman's (1990) definition of
efficiency in social arrangements. Another issue is: Why is Social Secu
rity different from other financial instruments that are offered by private
9 Barro (1974) discusses an alternative hypothesis, Ricardian Equivalence, which
suggests that taxpayers can not be fooled into underestimating the true tax burdens
associated with "complex" tax structures like Social Security.

financial firms? For example, would it be preferable to have one monop
oly bank so as to eliminate differences (and therefore taxpayer-choice
as well) in banks (e.g., banking hours , asset-and liability- managements,
number of branches, interest rate differentials, etc.)?
The issue of whether or not Social Security should be designed as a
welfare or income transfer system may dictate whether it is designed
to operate on a fully-funded or pay-as-you-go basis and whether its
design allows exit options. For example, exit options are inconsistent
with a pay-as-you-go system, since that system is designed to redistrib
ute income. 10 With exit options, retirees would tend to migrate to areas
where Social Security tax revenues per retiree are highest and therefore
undermine the ability of policymakers to redistribute income. In other
words, policymakers who wish to redistribute income through the
Social Security program would prefer that the program operate on a
pay-as-you-go basis and recommend that its structure eliminate exit
options. On the other hand, if policymakers wished to make the Social
Security program a pension fund whereby government invested the
savings of taxpayers in a fund that would be utilized at the time of
their retirement, the program would be designed with a fully-funded
operating constraint. Fifty different state systems would be viable under
a contractually-grounded, fully-funded method of finance that vests
funds with the contributors, but it would be inconsistent with mainte
nance of pay-as-you-go systems that allowed exit options for contribu
tors and beneficiaries. 1I Without the goal of redistributing income, the
availability of exit options would not tend to undermine the viability
of fifty different and fully-funded state systems, but, rather, tend to
strengthen the financial soundness of programs since they would now
be subject to intergovernmental competition.
Conclusion
One recommendation that follows from the conventional model of the
policy process is that constitutions should be designed with controls
10 See Browning and Browning (1987) for a discussion of these issues.
11 Ifthe program is not designed to redistribute income, then the importance of having
it publicly provided also diminishes since, like private savings accounts, they could be
provided by the private sector. In this case, some policymakers may argue that public
provision remains necessary because, without a public program, some subset oftaxpayers
would not save for their retirement. Of course, critics of this view may argue that the
current Social Security system does not do a better job of saving for taxpayers. While
these issues are interesting, they are not the focus of this paper.

on the abilities of taxpayers to flee benevolent government policies.
Analysis using the constitutional economics model of the policy process
raises the possibility that policymakers are not benevolent and that the
interests of taxpayers are furthered by choice in government supply.
Widened choice in supply is argued to enhance the communication
characteristics of the voice and exit options within the policy process
and lead to policies that better reflect the desires of taxpayers.
Some fiscal constitutions, such as in the case of Social Security, are
designed to eliminate choice in government supply. Analysis from the
conventional viewpoint emphasizes the importance of policy outcomes
and therefore recommends that fiscal constitutions be designed so as to
discourage the ability of taxpayers to refuse policies that policymakers
believe improve social welfare. Analysis within the constitutional eco
nomics viewpoint emphasizes the importance of designing fiscal consti
tutions which do not coerce individual taxpayers and therefore recom
mends that unlimited exit options be a characteristic ofthe constitution.
That more centralized governments tend to be larger governments
may explain the underlying motivation for the dichotomy in policy
prescriptions regarding the design of the exit option. 12 Elimination of
exit options may tend to be advocated by those who believe that the
public sector tends to be too small. Monopolization through elimination
of exit options allows policymakers to provide policies that mobile
taxpayers would tend to flee. Monopolization under this normative
assessment of government size appears to be a natural policy prescrip
tion since, by lowering the ability of taxpayers to utilize voice and exit
options within the policy process, monopolistic structures expand the
abilities of policymakers to provide policies.
Relatively competitive fiscal structures may tend to be advocated by
those who believe that government tends to overexpand and therefore
exit possibilities are considered to be desirable elements of the constitu
tion since they enhance the abilities of taxpayers to reject policies that
they do not want. Given the differences in perceptions ofthe appropriate
size of government, it is not surprising that such diverse views exist on
the design of efficient fiscal constitutions. The alternative models of the
policy process indicate that the primary difference rests on who is
believed to recognize appropriate policy: taxpayers or policymakers?
12 See Marlow (1988) and Joulfaian and Marlow (I 99 I) for a discussion of the empirical
evidence on the centralization-government size relationship.

Proponents of the conventional model of the policy process prescribe
that fiscal constitutions be designed with primary leverage awarded to
policymakers while proponents of the constitutional economics model
recommend that individual taxpayers be awarded primary leverage in
the policy process.
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